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ABSTRACT 
This analysis examines the Defense Health Agency’s (DHA) transition plan with 
regard to contracting operations within the Military Health System (MHS). First, the 
study addresses various Government Accountability Office (GAO) cases relating to 
healthcare reform. The documents establish a pattern of the government’s attempt to 
address needed change in the MHS. Next, the analysis provides an overview of 
contracting capabilities from each service component. The findings highlight the impact 
of these capabilities as a result of DHA’s authority, direction, and control (ADC) of the 
MTFs. Third, the analysis addresses the efficiencies in the acquisition process. The 
findings identify any gained efficiencies as described in DHA’s Quadruple Aim initiative. 
Additionally, the analysis addresses the Medical Q-Service contracting vehicle. The 
results highlight cost-savings using this strategic, contract vehicle and compare the data 
to market trends and government expenditures. The results of this study will lend a better 
understanding of the operational and strategic impact of the DHA transition plan. Last, 
the recommendations focus on optimizing existing operational capabilities and processes, 
and increasing contracting efficiencies. The goal is to improve the overall ability to 
conduct medical contracting operations effectively while reducing costs and maintaining 
a high level of medical capability. 
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The Military Health System (MHS) is a core system of the Department of Defense
(DOD) that serves over 9.6 million beneficiaries and has a budget for the fiscal year 2020 
of $49.5 billion (Mendez, 2019). The MHS benefit administered by the military medical 
service departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. These departments include Army 
Medical Command (MEDCOM), Air Force Medical Service, Navy Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery (BUMED), and the Defense Health Agency (DHA). Each service component 
provides separate contracting support to their designated Military Treatment Facilities 
(MTF) as well. The Army is the only department with a medical contracting activity, the 
United States Army Health Contracting Activity (USAHCA), which is outfitted with both 
military and civilian workforce. 
The MHS reform has been one of the top three priorities of Congress in the last 
three National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) 2016 through 2019. Most notably, 
NDAA 2017 directed DHA to assume administrative responsibilities of each MTF from 
the service components in the United States (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017, 2016). As a result of this directive, multiple lines of effort (LOE) were created 
for each service component to maximize support of the initiatives as each department 
postures its formations to execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS).  
To optimize one of the most comprehensive healthcare systems in the world, 
Congress must reform an antiquated MHS through modernization, streamlining, and 
collaboration. To facilitate the reform, in accordance with Section 702 of NDAA 2017 and 
NDAA 2019, the DOD laid out a plan to transition MTFs from the service to the DHA over 
a three-year time frame. The purpose of the change of the MHS is to implement a unified 
system of readiness and healthcare delivery (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017, 2016). Upon completion of the transition, DHA will assume all MTFs within 
the DOD through the utilization of its market-based management model (Defense Health 
Agency [DHA], 2019). 
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One of the key focus areas of this research paper is the impact on contracting 
operations within the MHS. The synchronization of contracting capabilities to provide a 
unified platform to support healthcare services and support is critical throughout the 
transition process. This research aims to highlight the LOEs through the lens of the 
USAHCA, the Army’s medical contracting arm, as the organization undergoes a variety of 
structural and contracting policy changes in order to aid DHA in the desired end state of 
an integrated healthcare system. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH
This research aims to analyze previous and current acquisition strategies of the
MHS through the perspective of Army medical contracting. Further examination will 
address key elements and significant milestones of the DHA transition process and 
implementation plan. The second objective of this research is to identify potential risks, 
capability gaps, and opportunities for mitigation as DHA continues its implementation 
strategy of a unified healthcare system.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research addresses the following research questions:
1. How has the contracting capabilities and processes from each service
component been affected upon inception of DHA assuming administrative
responsibility of MTFs on 1 October 2018?
2. Is DHA gaining the desired efficiencies in acquisitions and procurement
operations after achieving authority, direction, and control (ADC)?
3. Does the Medical Q-coded Service (MQS) strategic sourcing vehicle
generate cost-savings?
D. METHODOLOGY
To help answer the research questions, we utilized multiple data tools within the
Army acquisition community. These tools included the Virtual Contracting Enterprise 
(VCE), Virtual Contracting Enterprise Business Intelligence (VCE-BI), Procurement 
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Desktop Defense (PD2), Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment (PIEE), Federal 
Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG), and Beta.Sam.Gov to gather 
contracting metrics. The goal of the financial data is to identify and analyze trends in 
respect to DHA’s Quadruple Aim initiative. Further information will highlight some of the 
critical components of DHA’s implementation plan and assess some of the strategic, 
contracting vehicles employed during the transition process. Other research material will 
come from military regulations, publications, policies, conference forums, and public 
search engines, which will only be collected from 2016 through May 2020. The intent is to 
target data collected and analyzed before the DOD response to COVID-19. 
E. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH
The time for healthcare reform is now. The DOD has longed for efficiency and
opportunities to implement cost-saving measures through strategic reform. With the 
passage of NDAA 2017 and 2019, Congress, along with supporting cast within the DOD 
service components, is postured to do just that. The business cost of military healthcare 
exceeds $50 Billion annually, so efforts to employ efficiencies while building a better 
healthcare system would be a significant achievement for the health and welfare of Service 
members, Veterans, and family members. DHA has the lead for spearheading this effort. 
Their strategic approach to consolidate business practices across the services energizes the 
opportunity to achieve a joint health system. Contracting and procurement services will be 
a critical function across all services. Opportunities to consolidate and streamline 
acquisition processes and authority may impose additional complexity throughout the 
process. This research aims at identifying these factors through holistic research and 
provides recommendations that will support the DOD’s vision of a Joint health system. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH
This analysis has several limitations. One limitation is the fact that the data
presented is from manual input and human submission. Human error will always be a factor 
when reviewing information within data systems that are inputted manually. For this 
research, we will assume that the data presented is accurate to the extent that it has been 
vetted for public release. 
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Another limitation is that information retrieved from public testimony, telecast, or 
open forums is subjective. One can assume that each presenter or public figure must present 
their viewpoint or provide public information that may be within the bounds of their 
organizations or position of authority. Thus, the information gathered within these types of 
forums are subjective. For this research, information gathered under these resources will 
be used as supporting evidence within this framework. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This paper consists of five chapters. The first chapter provides the background of 
the analysis, the purpose of the study, research questions, methodology, importance of the 
research, and the limitations experienced throughout the research. The second chapter is 
the literature review. This chapter will highlight the MHS transition process’s critical 
stakeholders and address critical elements within DHA’s implementation plan regarding 
contracting operations. The third chapter will describe the methodology of the research. 
This chapter will highlight DOD’s data and information systems that will provide evidence 
of efficiencies and cost-saving progress throughout the transition. The fourth chapter will 
address capability gaps through comparative analysis. The goal of this chapter is to assess 
the impact of planned milestones and actual events, according to DHA’s published 
transition timeline. The last chapter will bring the paper to a conclusion and present areas 
of emphasis that may require additional resources and considerations for DHA in their 
continued progression of a united military health system. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter of the research paper provided the introduction and background of the 
DHA transition and the key stakeholders involved that will aid the transformation with the 
goal of efficiency as the driving force throughout the process. The purpose of this analysis 
highlighted the intent of the research. Next, the chapter presented research questions that 
will frame the information and data collected through the process. In addition, this section 
outlined the methods that will be employed to highlight critical sources that will support 
the study’s framework. Furthermore, the chapter outlined the importance of the study and 
how the transformation process will gain efficiencies, identify capability gaps, and address 
5 
points of contention. However, some limitations will impact the research, but through 
validated resources, increase the validity and reliability of the information. Lastly, the 
organization of this research is in a chronological manner that will be conducive for public 
reading and bring awareness to those familiar with the transition and those that may be 
unaware of the ongoing efforts of MHS reform. The next chapter presents a history of the 
MHS Reform, congressional directives, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 
supporting documents that led to the NDAA 2017 directive for a complete transition of 
MTFs to DHA. 
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II. BACKGROUND/LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following background information includes federal law, policies, regulations, 
documented events, and change theories. This chapter begins with Kotter’s 8-Step Process 
for transforming an organization. DHA Component Acquisition Executive (CAE), Dr. 
Barclay Butler, highlights this particular theory to pinpoint some of the elements for 
organizational changes that DHA and other stakeholders may exhibit as part of the MTF 
transition. Next, the information addresses numerous GAO cases relating to MHS reform. 
Then, the information addresses NDAA 2017, the congressional directive that designates 
DHA as the lead agent for the MTF transition. Additional information will highlight the 
DOD’s transitional reform initiatives followed by an overview of DHA’s Plan 3 
Implementation, which provides details of how DHA intends to accomplish the transition 
process of military MTFs. 
B. KOTTER’S 8-STEP PROCESS FOR TRANSFORMING AN 
ORGANIZATION 
“In any type of transformation, the shift in culture is key” (Butler, 2018). The 
statement published in Fed Health IT; Dr. Butler, promotes the quadruple aim initiation of 
the MHS healthcare transformation. He references Kotter’s 8-Step Process for 
Transforming an Organization. Figure 1 depicts the 8-step process. John Kotter, author and 
strategist of the book Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, references eight 
steps that organizations should integrate as they undergo some form of organizational 
transformation. The first step under this theory is to create a sense of urgency. By creating 
a sense of urgency, organizations can identify the level of complacency within the 
workforce and employ the necessary resources to energize the organization to accept the 
change (Kotter, 2017). 
Step two focuses on building a guiding coalition. Mr. Kotter explains that a 
coalition is a “central to the network and consists of volunteers representing all levels, 
departments, and skills in the hierarchy” (Kotter, 2017). Step 3 is creating a vision. Kotter 
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expresses that “an organization must create a vision which focuses on maximizing 
opportunities and appeals to the emotions of those impacted by the transformation” In 
addition, the transformation plan should include strategic initiatives that achieve the vision. 
Step 4 focuses on enlisting a volunteer army. Mr. Kotter explains that it is a “guiding 
coalition’s responsibility to communicate the vision and the strategy in such a way that 
employees buy into the message, commit to it, and feel motivated to volunteer to be a part 
of the change” (Kotter, 2017). Step 5 of transforming an organization focuses on enabling 
actions by removing barriers.  
Anything that gets in the way of achieving the vision is identified and 
solved. Kotter sees suitably qualified and skilled members of the network 
volunteering deal with an identified barrier and then implementing the 
solution within the hierarchy. (Kotter, 2017) 
Step 6 is to generate short term wins. Mr. Kotter states, “the guiding coalition must 
celebrate and communicate visible and significant short-term wins in order to generate 
motivation and confirm that decisions and actions are benefiting the organization” (Kotter, 
2017). Next, is to sustain acceleration “the sense of urgency around the big opportunity 
must be maintained with new projects, themes, and volunteers in order to invigorate people 
and the process” (Kotter, 2017). The last step of the process is to institute change. Mr. 
Kotter states,  
Change needs to be assimilated into the organization. It needs to be 
normalized in the culture of the organization and the link made between the 
change and organizational success. Methods to ensure leadership 
development and succession need to be integrated into the organization. 
(Kotter, 2017) 
Dr. Butler’s reference to Kotter’s 8-step process to organizational change is a 
prelude to DHA’s implementation strategy, but the overhaul of the MHS has been on the 
DOD’s agenda for several years. The following GAO reports highlighting some of the key 
findings, which eventually led to the passage of NDAA 2017, directing DHA to take full 




Figure 1. Kotter’s Eight Steps to Transforming Your Organization. Source: 
Kotter (1995). 
C. GAO-13-322, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEEDS A STRATEGIC 
APPROACH TO CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH CARE 
PROFESSIONALS 
In May 2013, Per NDAA 2012, the GAO published a report addressing contracting 
for medical services. At this time, the DOD was in the process of implementing its plans 
to establish the DHA. According to the report’s findings, the military departments execute 
the majority of their contracting for health care professionals separately and do not have 
an enterprise-wide strategy in place. Secondly, the military departments attempted to 
consolidate requirements and issue multiple-award contracts, which led to successful 
outcomes; however, a need for more consolidation remained (Woods, 2013). Last, the 
GAO reported that competition was created between the military departments unknowingly 
when contracting for similar health care professionals in the same region (Woods, 2013). 
The GAO recommendations included that the Secretary of Defense should “develop a 
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DOD-wide strategic approach to contracting for health care professionals” (Woods, 2013). 
In conclusion, the GAO report stated: 
In the absence of a DOD-wide approach to acquiring medical services, each 
military department takes a fragmented approach to contract for medical 
professionals without considering the collective needs of the MHS. 
However, according to the report, DOD is in the process of revising the 
governance structure of the MHS to centralize certain functions, such as 
acquisitions, that are fragmented among the military departments. 
Consequently, now is a particularly opportune time to revisit the need for a 
DOD-wide strategic sourcing strategy with both near-term and long-term 
dimensions, including reliable and detailed agency-wide data. Without such 
a strategy, the Military Health System may be missing opportunities for 
acquiring professional medical services in the most cost-effective manner. 
(Woods, 2013) 
The next GAO report addresses DOD to submit detailed plans on its efforts to 
reform the MHS. 
D. GAO-14-49, DEFENSE HEALTH CARE REFORM: ADDITIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS WOULD INCREASE TRANSPARENCY 
OF DOD’S PLANS AND ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY 
In November 2013, the GAO published a report in which the NDAA 2013 required 
the DOD to “provide three submissions detailing its plan to reform its MHS governance 
structure and also mandated that GAO submit an analysis of DOD’s first two submissions” 
(Farrell, 2013). This particular report addressed 87 performance measures and seven goals 
for MHS reform. The GAO further highlighted critical benchmarks related to the formation 
of the DHA. The information addressed estimates of authorized staff needed for the DHA 
headquarters and highlighted “estimated implementation costs and aggregated cost-savings 
estimates for the consolidation of four shared services” (Farrell, 2013). The report 
highlighted that:  
Health care consumes an increasingly large portion of the defense budget, 
DOD leadership has acknowledged the need to reduce duplication and 
overhead, operate its health system as efficiently as possible, and realize 
savings in the MHS through the adoption of common clinical and business 
processes. (Farrell, 2013) 
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Figure 2 illustrates the organizational structure of the military health system before 
1 October 2013.  
 
Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the Military Health System Prior to 
October 1, 2013. Source: Farrell (2013). 
Additionally, the report addresses six areas throughout the country, which the DOD 
designated as “enhanced Multi-Service Markets” (Farrell, 2013). Multi-Service Markets 
are defined as “areas in which more than one DOD component provides military health 
care services” (Farrell, 2013). Each of these markets will implement a “5-year performance 
plan to produce improvements in clinical and business practices and cost, infrastructure, 
and personnel reductions” (Farrell, 2013). Additionally, the GAO report addressed seven 
goals to support the DOD overarching strategic goals for greater system integration of the 
MHS: 
1. promote more-effective and efficient health care operations through 
enhanced enterprise-wide shared services 
2. deliver more-comprehensive primary care and integrated health services 
using advanced patient-centered medical home 
3. coordinate care over time and across treatment settings to improve 
outcomes in the management of chronic illness, particularly for patients 
with complex medical and social problems 
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4. match personnel, infrastructure, and funding to current missions, future 
missions, and population demand 
5. establish more inter-service standards and metrics, and standardize 
processes to promote learning and continuous improvement 
6. create enhanced value in military medical markets using an integrated 
approach specified in 5-year business performance plans 
7. align incentives with health and readiness outcomes to reward value 
creation. (Farrell, 2013) 
The next GAO report addresses the need for senior leader involvement in achieving 
cost savings in the MHS.  
E. GAO-14-396T, SUSTAINED SENIOR LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO FULLY 
DEVELOP PLANS FOR ACHIEVING COST SAVINGS 
In February 2014, the GAO released a report titled “Sustained Senior Leadership 
Needed to Fully Develop Plans for Achieving Cost Savings.” This report highlighted that 
the DOD cost to maintain the current MHS would increase by approximately $20 billion 
by 2028 (Farrell, 2014). This particular report addressed previous studies in which the 
DOD considered efforts to overhaul the MHS. The report noted that in 2006, the DOD 
deliberated maintaining the structure of the MHS in place, but considered shared-services 
to consolidate standard MHS functions. To streamline these efforts, the DOD announced 
the formation of the DHA with an effective date of 1 October 2013. Upon inception, the 
DOD charged the DHA with seven focused goals: 
1. consolidate functions (shared services) common to DOD 
2. deliver more-integrated health care in areas with more than one military 
service 
3. establish more-standardized processes 
4. more-closely align financial incentives with health and readiness 
outcomes,  
5. match other resources with missions 
6. deliver more primary care and other health services, and  
7. better coordinate care over time and across treatment settings. (Farrell, 
2014)  
The next GAO case addresses the organizational structure of the medical force.  
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F. GAO-16-820, DOD NEEDS FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE SIZE, 
READINESS, AND EFFICIENCY OF THE MEDICAL FORCE 
In September 2016, the GAO released a report titled “DOD Needs Further Analysis 
of the Size, Readiness, And Efficiency of The Medical Force. In this particular report, the 
GAO studied “weaknesses within the MHS and to leverage advances in civilian business 
practices” (Farrell, 2016). The study identified several deficiencies in the medical 
workforce. In addition, research revealed the DOD did not optimize methods to capitalize 
on cost-savings. The GAO suggests several recommendations. One recommendation was 
to “conduct a new analysis of the required number of active-duty and civilian medical 
personnel that mitigates known limitations” (Farrell, 2016). Furthermore, the GAO 
recommended that the DOD develop a strategy to maintain providers’ clinical skills and 
increase the output of active duty-providers. Lastly, the GAO highlighted that the DOD 
should provide further detail in cost estimations when considering changes to medical 
facilities. The next section addresses the release of NDAA 2017. 
G. NDAA 2017 
The NDAA is a succession of federal laws outlying the budget and expenditures of 
the DOD. Over the past several decades, the MHS has been one of the major cost-drivers 
of delivery medical care to Warfighters, veterans, and family members. Numerous 
government entities have indicated a need to restructure the MHS (Mendez, 2019). As a 
result, the NDAA 2017 section 702 passed into law as an initiative to create an integrated 
MHS to implement efficiencies and cost-saving strategies across the military MTFs. As of 
1 October 2018, all MTFs within the DOD would begin transitioning administration 
management to the DHA (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 2016). 
In accordance with section 702 of NDAA 2017, the DHA will primarily be responsible for 
the following shared services: budget, information technology, health care administration 
and management, administrative policy and procedure, military medical construction, and 
any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate (National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, 2016). The next GAO case addresses the transfer 
of MTFs and efficiency.  
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H. GAO-19-53, DOD SHOULD DEMONSTRATE HOW ITS PLAN TO 
TRANSFER THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY TREATMENT 
FACILITIES WILL IMPROVE EFFICIENCY 
In the October 2018 report, the GAO highlighted the DOD’s effort to address the 
following areas:  
1. how the DHA will take administrative responsibility of the MTFs  
2. efforts to eliminate duplicative activities 
3. efforts to maximize efficiencies in the DHA’s activities; and  
4. reductions of headquarters-level military, civilian, and contractor 
personnel (Farrell, 2018)  
The report highlighted the steps that the DOD took to improve efficiencies, but 
noted the need to solidify the reduction of “headquarters-level personnel, including 
contractor personnel, by 10 percent and exclusion of transferring 16 operational readiness 
and installation-specific medical functions” (Farrell, 2018). One of these excluded 
operational-readiness functions included: dental care. The next section addresses DOD’s 
implementation plan of how the DHA will transition.  
I. DOD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
The DOD’s plan to implement Section 1073c of Title 10, United States Code (USC) 
in response to Section 702(e)(2) of the NDAA 2017 (Public Law 114-328) was written on 
30 June 2018. The report provides recommendations of how DHA will transition 
administrative management of all MTFs from the military departments through a phased 
approach over three years (Wilkie, 2018). In accordance with NDAA 2017, the MHS 
reform is directed by Congress to start transitioning by 1 October 2018 and be completed 
by 30 September 2021.  
There are three principal efforts underway aimed at maximizing efficiencies 
in the MHS and improving performance: (a) the redesign and 
standardization of business and clinical processes to achieve greater 
efficiencies across the enterprise; (b) the development and implementation 
of DHA-established Procedural Instructions (DHAPIs); and (c) the 
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establishment of the Quadruple Aim Performance Plan (QPP). (Wilkie, 
2018). 
Through a centralized administrative framework, the DOD framed five necessities 
for transforming the MHS:  
• Define medical readiness across all services 
• Utilize the new MHS as a platform for medical training 
• Standardize shared services  
• Improve patient experience 
• Modernize TRICARE health plans into two comprehensive options 
(Wilkie, 2018) 
These reform initiatives provide critical instruction which enables DHA to function 
and operate the MHS as one enterprise. The next section describes DOD’s organization of 
DHA and the key stakeholders that will aid in the transition process regarding current 
contracting operations. 
J. DHA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Shortly after designation as the lead agent for the MTF transition, DHA released 
several versions of its strategic plan to lay the framework for a Joint Health System. DHA 
aligned its efforts to the Quadruple Aim concept to advance the framework: improve 
readiness, lower cost, better health care, and better health. Each of these pillars poses a 
myriad of challenges across the enterprise, so maximum support was required from all 
stakeholders. Figure 3 provides a systematic timeline of the transformation with a goal of 
30 September 2021 to achieve a full transition of the MHS enterprise. 
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Figure 3. Plan 3 Implementation of NDAA 2017. Source DHA (2019). 
1. Market Construct 
One of the critical components of the transition strategy is the market construct 
(DHA, 2019). The goal of this key element is to minimize disruption in operations, both 
current and associated with future requirements. The additional role of the market-based 
structure is to manage MTFs and clinics adequately. Figure 4, MHS Market Structure, is a 
depiction of the market construct. These facilities will be responsible for “generating 
medical readiness of active duty members, internal medical personnel, and families in their 
regions (DHA, 2019). Through the restructuring of the market, each medical facility 
postured to provide immediate resources within their market space and meet the customer-
patient demands and readiness of military personnel. 
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Figure 4. MHS Market Structure. Source: DHA (2019). 
a. Large Markets 
In areas where there are a significant number of medical facilities and patients, 
DHA designated these facilities as centers of excellence for specialty care (DHA, 2020). 
Twenty-one large markets have a significant patient population, as depicted in Figure 5 
and Figure 6 (DHA, 2019). More than half of all beneficiaries make up this market and 
have the highest number of patient encounters as a result. Womack Army Medical Center 
(WAMC), one of the first MTFs to complete the transition to DHA, is a prime example of 
how an MTF in a large market will function. Further examination of this particular facility 
will be revealed in the analysis section of this research.  
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Figure 5. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Large 
Markets. Source: Military Health System (2019). 
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Figure 6. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Large 
Markets. Source: Military Health System (2019). 
b. Small Markets 
Small Markets and Stand-Alone Organizations (SSO) consists of 16 geographic 
locations throughout the United States (DHA, 2019). The small markets comprised mostly 
of community hospitals that provide inpatient care, ambulatory services, and other medical 
support services (DHA, 2019). Figure 7 and Figure 8 highlights the small markets within 
the United States. Small markets that align outside of a marked region will report to an 
SSO for administrative support (DHA, 2019). This will include medical facilities overseas, 
including Europe and the Pacific market. Figure 9 and Figure 10 depict the market structure 
outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). The next section will discuss levels of 
administrative, operational capability.  
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Figure 7. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Small Markets 
and Stand-Alone Organizations. Source: Military Health System 
(2019). 
 
Figure 8. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Small Markets 




Figure 9. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Small Markets 
and Stand-Alone Organizations, Indo-Pacific. Source: Military 
Health System (2019). 
 
 
Figure 10. Alignment of Hospitals and Clinics by Market Type. Small Markets 
and Stand-Alone Organizations, Europe. Source: Military Health 
System (2019). 
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2. Levels of Administrative Control 
To monitor the status of the MTFs, DHA adopted several definitions to identify 
thresholds of administrative, operational capability during the transition process. “ADC” 
indicates that DHA has “full operational control over the MTF in accordance with 
governing law, regulations, policies, and procedures” (DHA, 2019). Once DHA has ADC, 
the level of control shifts to an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) (DHA, 2019). When an 
MTF is determined to have IOC, this indicates that DHA has ADC, but through the use of 
Direct Support (DS) from each service component Medical Department Intermediate 
Management Organization (IMO) (DHA, 2019). Figure 11 illustrates the organizational 
structure of an IMO.  
In addition, each Medical Department is responsible for functional support until the 
conditions-based transfer of authority can be achieved. Once a facility has achieved full 
operating capability (FOC), this indicates that DHA has ADC to include the functions 
transferred during IOC with the addition of the MILDEP Medical Departments 
relinquishment of the responsibility of support operations of the MTFs (DHA, 2019). To 
avoid any administrative delays in the transition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) may be initiated with the service component to 
continue DS (DHA, 2019). The previous section highlighted elements of DHA’s transition 
process from market construct to administrative, operating levels. The next section 
addresses acquisitions and contracting. The following information will highlight some of 




Figure 11. DHA Intermediate Management Organization (IMO) Chart. Source: 
DHA (2018). 
3. Acquisition and Procurement 
Appendix #7: Acquisition of the DHA Implementation Plan 3 discusses 
acquisitions and contracting. Highlighted as one of the shared services, acquisitions, and 
contracting is an area in which DHA sought to improve efficiency and reduce redundancy 
(DHA, 2019). DHA aimed to transfer these functions from the MILDEPs to DHA to 
streamline the acquisition process. Under the current proposal, responsibility for MTF 
contracting will be transferred to DHA. The Air Force support to the MTFs will continue 
through a DHA - Air Force Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The acquisition and 
procurement function of the NMLC, coupled with entirely of the USAHCA, will be 
transferred to DHA in a manner that minimizes disruption, preserves organization stability, 
and maintains supportive relationships during the transition to an optimal organization 
design structure in support of MTFs (DHA, 2019).  
4. Summary 
This literature review addressed the aggregation of MHS reform. First, the section 
highlighted multiple GAO reports, referencing factors, issues, other supporting reasons in 
which Congress deemed necessary to direct the overhaul of the MHS. Next, the DOD’s 
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plan to implement a transition strategy of the MHS was presented. Additionally, a review 
of DHA’s implementation strategy, to include market construct, and administrative 
operating capabilities. The goal of this section was to highlight the common theme of 
reducing redundancies, consolidation, and cost-savings. The next section provides the 
methodology used to research DHA’s implementation strategy and the impact on 





This chapter describes the methodology used to establish the research paper’s 
foundation to answer the proposed research questions. The research includes a literature 
review that covers Kotter’s Change Theory, multiple GAO reports, the NDAA 2017, and 
other government material related to the DHA transition process. This chapter first explains 
the contracting capability of DHA and each service component. The goal is identifying any 
similarities in systems or processes in which DHA aims to adopt. The further analysis 
identifies various contracting authorities and DHA’s ability to create or leverage existing 
authorities. The goal is to assess DHA’s contracting posture at the inception of the 
administrative responsibility of MTFs. Next, this chapter explains the data collection process 
from one of the MTFs identified as part of the transition. The data from the MTF was then 
used to identify trends that coincide the transition, from inception to present. The results of 
the trends will then be analyzed against DHA’s efficiency measures. Additional data will 
address the use of the MQS vehicle (Defense Health Agency, 2018-b). MQS is a DOD-wide 
strategic sourcing vehicle that serves an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) 
awarded as a Total Small Business Set-aside (DHA, 2018). The goal is to identify trends in 
cost-savings through the use of this mandated vehicle. Last, the data will address DHA’s 
requirements portal. The goal is to identify if the use of the consolidation portal produces 
efficiencies in processing time. The next section discusses the development of the DHA 
transition database. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DHA TRANSITION DATABASE 
1. Sources 
Data gathering began by reviewing the public release of the 2017 annual report of the 
NDAA by the 116th Congress, which directed DHA to take administrative control of all 
MTFs formerly. From this information, we obtained public documents from the DHA 
website. These documents, town hall presentations, policies, and congressional testimony 
referenced DHA’s role as outlined in the NDAA. Also, the documents identified key 
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stakeholders that would take part in the new reform. To collect an adequate amount of 
information which led to the release of NDAA 2017, multiple GAO reports dated before the 
release of the NDAA 2017 were collected and reviewed. The goal of this collection was to 
identify common themes. These commonalities centered on the terms “consolidation, 
efficiency, cost-savings, reducing redundancies, and streamlining.” For this research paper, 
we sought acquisitions and contracting information to support the purpose of this paper. 
Through DHA-related websites and SharePoint, a copy of DHA’s Implementation Plan 3 
was obtained. DHA’s Implementation Plan 3 was the key document that sourced a majority 
of the research. Appendix 7: Acquisitions of the DHA’s Implementation Plan 3 specifically 
provided the framework for DHA’s process of assuming acquisition authority from each of 
the service components. Next, each service components’ website was visited to obtain 
information about the transition. Here, contracting capabilities, roles, and responsibly 
information were collected regarding roles and responsibilities. The goal for this information 
is to identify the differences and similarities in contracting capabilities of the service 
components and analyze how those capabilities and processes will be optimized and 
consolidated in support of DHA assuming administrative control of MTFs. 
2. Alignment to Research Question 1 
To help answer the research questions, we utilized multiple data tools within the 
Army acquisition community. These tools included the FPDS-NG, VCE, PD2, PIEE, and 
Beta.Sam.Gov to gather contracting metrics. To answer the first research question “How has 
the contracting capabilities and processes from each service component been affected upon 
inception of DHA assuming administration responsibility of MTFs on 1 October 2018?,” we 
compared the contracting capability of DHA and each service component before the release 
of NDAA 2017 and post-release of NDAA 2017. The goal was to identify the process or 
method that DHA would employ to consolidate the contracting process upon being 
designated as the administrative lead agent as of 1 October 2018. As part of the consolidation 
efforts for contracting and acquisitions, DHA required the use of its requirements portal for 
submission of all contracting requirements from MTFs. To analyze if this requirement 
process streamlined or created time-saved or administrative efficiencies, the requirements 
process from the DHA website was collected and information for service components to be 
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submitted. The information was then compared to the current Procurement Acquisition Lead 
Time (PALT) in use by the Army Contracting Command (ACC) and the USAHCA. In 
addition, the number of contracting actions performed by the Navy and the Army were 
highlighted to demonstrate if the DHA requirements process, as it stands, results in efficiently 
processing time for contract administration.  
3. Alignment to Research Question 2 
To answer the research question, “Is DHA gaining the desired efficiencies in 
acquisitions and procurement operations?” we analyzed contracting data of WAMC, the first 
Army MTF that has fully-transitioned to DHA. The goal of the contracting data was to 
identify and analyze trends in respect to DHA’s Quadruple Aim initiative of lower-cost. 
The data collected from WAMC would then be compared to the contracting data of other 
MTFs that have not completed the full transition to DHA. The point here was to analyze 
contracting costs over a 4-year period to see which MTFs decreased spending, ultimately 
achieving cost-savings. 
4. Alignment to Research Question 3 
To answer the third question, “Does MQS generate cost savings?,” the data collected 
from VCE-BI strictly targeted MQS contracts. Contracts were able to be filtered by the 
Product Service Code (PSC) code of Q200 to Q500. From VCE-BI, data was pulled from 
seven MTFs, included WAMC. Once collected, the contract award amount was compared to 
the national and market value of that provider. The approach here was to compare what the 
government paid to the market value, both national and by MTF market location. The goal 
of this data was to address the research question and determine if this mandated contract 
vehicle generates cost-savings. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology for this research. The chapter addressed the 
sources used to build a database to support the literature review. The next chapter discusses 
the findings and analysis of the research. Last, the chapter addresses recommendations based 
on the findings.  
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IV. FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the findings, analysis, and recommendations with regards to 
the research questions introduced in Chapter I. First; the information addresses how the 
services contracting operations and processes will be affected by the MHS reform. The 
information will highlight the contracting operations of each service stakeholder before 
and after the release of the NDAA and analyze DHA’s actions taken to consolidate this 
effort. Next, the chapter will address the efficiency of DHA’s acquisition and contracting 
strategy through the lens of their Quadruple Aim initiative. The following information will 
analyze contracting data from Womack Army Medical Center, the first Army MTF to 
complete ADC under DHA, and compare the contracting data against a sample of MTFs 
that have not completed the full transition. The goal is to identify spending trends, 
contracting opportunities, and other developments resulting from the data presented. 
Additionally, the information will address if the MQS contracting vehicle generates 
cost-savings. The data will assess the effectiveness of this mandated contracting vehicle by 
analyzing recent awards. The information will draw comparisons and differences in the use 
of MQS against market costs for medical providers. Finally, we present recommendations 
based on research results. 
B. FINDINGS 
The DHA Transition Database contained multiple supporting documentation, 
tables, and figures representing DHA’s efforts to assume ADC of all MTFs. Also, three 
different contract administration systems were used to validate contracting data. Additional 
data was collected over four years of market patterns and trends of medical provider 
services and specialties. The figures and tables within reflect the analysis of total contracts 
awarded, contracts award using the MQS, and average market costs compared to what the 
government paid. 
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(1) How has the contracting capabilities and processes from each service 
component been affected upon inception of DHA assuming administration 
responsibility of MTFs on 1 October 2018? 
The section presents data that we gathered to answer the research question, “How 
will the services contracting operations and processes be affected by the MHS reform?” 
The findings compare the service components and DHA’s contracting operations and 
practices before and post-enactment of NDAA 2017. 
a. Pre-NDAA 2017 DHA Contracting Operations Overview 
The mission of DHA is to “lead the MHS integration of readiness and health to 
deliver the Quadruple Aim: increased readiness, better health, better care, and lower cost” 
(Military Health System, n.d.-a). Currently, contracting operations reside in the DHA J-4 
Acquisition section and have the ability to perform contracting administration within their 
agency. Also, DHA can conduct: 
• Acquisition Process Support 
• Strategic Acquisition Program Management 
• Acquisition Policy and Control 
• Head Contracting Activity/Contracting Operations (Military 
Health System, n.d.-b)  
Most of DHA’s contracting authority comes from the CAE who provides oversight 
and approval of all acquisition matters for the agency (Military Health System, n.d.-b). In 
addition to the areas listed above, DHA can “administer, product conceptualization, 
program initiation, design, development, test, production, deployment, logistical support, 
modification, and product disposal” (Military Health System, n.d.-b). The next section 
describes the USAHCA organization and its contracting operations before the release of 
the NDAA 2017. 
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b. Pre-NDAA 2017 USAHCA Contracting Operations Overview 
USAHCA is the direct contracting arm of Army Medicine. The Headquarters is 
located at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, and supports a tri-service beneficiary population 
of service members, family members, and retirees (United States Army Health Contracting 
Activity [USAHCA], n.d.). Contracting authority for the organization is provided by the 
ACC. The Army’s standard system for contract writing is PD2. The organization is known 
for the administration and award of health services and medical supply contracts. Some of 
these procurement actions include: nurses, transcription services, laboratory services, 
imaging maintenance services, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, ancillary services, 
hospital housekeeping, laundry, linen distribution, regulated medical waste, and contracted 
advisory/assistance services (USAHCA, n.d.). 
For contract filing, USAHCA utilizes the VCE Paperless Contract File (PCF), 
which is a secure, web-based virtual contracting office with a structured file format that 
provides transparency to Army’s leaders (Virtual Contracting Enterprise, n.d.). For 
uniformed acquisition policy, the organization utilizes the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). For service-
specific policies and regulations, USAHCA references the Army Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (AFAR). USAHCA’s organizational alignment is distributed across multiple 
markets to support all Army MTFs (CONUS and OCONUS). Figure 12 illustrates the 
current Common Operating Picture (COP) of the organization. 
The market-based alignment creates a direct line of support between the customer 
and the medical contracting branch within their geographic location. Last, the 
organizational construct is designed to support both Garrison and Operational Contract 
Support during contingency operations. Next, the information will describe the contracting 
operation of the Navy.  
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Figure 12. USAHCA Common Operating Picture. Source: USAHCA (2020). 
c. Pre-NDAA 2017 Navy BUMED Contracting Operations Overview 
The Navy BUMED provides command and control over all Navy medicine. The 
NMLC directly reports to the BUMED and oversees the Navy’s medical contracting 
mission. The BUMED’s Senior Contracting Official (SCO) is seated down at the NMLC 
and receives their contracting authority from the Naval Supply System Command 
(NAVSUP) HCA (Naval Medical Logistics Command [NMLC], n.d.-a).  
Within the NMLC is the Acquisition and Analytics Directorate, which “develops 
and executes contracts for health care services, supplies, and equipment; medical research 
and development; information technology support” for the “expeditionary medical 
facilities, and shore-based treatment facilities worldwide” (NMLC, n.d.-b). The NMLC 
centrally owns the assets (e.g., contracting, technical and legal) for Navy medicine. This 
unique capability allows the MTF customers to work alongside the assets mentioned before 
in identifying requirements and developing solutions early in the acquisition planning 
phase. For Contract Administration, the organization utilizes the Standard Procurement 
System (SPS), also referred to as PD2. For a unified acquisition policy, the contracting 
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activities reference the FAR and DFARS, and for service-specific policies and regulation, 
the BUMED references the Navy-Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(NMCARS). 
d. Pre-NDAA 2017 Air Force Contracting Operations Overview 
The United States Air Force Medical services, unlike the Navy and Army, do not 
have a separate medical contracting organization that supports the Air Force MTFs. The 
773d Enterprise Sourcing Squadron, which is part of the Air Force Installation Contracting 
Center (AFICC), “provides enterprise-wide medical acquisition support to the Air Force 
Medical Service (AFMS)” (Wright-Patterson AFB, 2019). Each installation contracting 
squadron (CON) provides contracting support for necessary medical supplies and services 
to support each clinic located on that installation. 
The Air Force Head of Contracting authority lies with the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Contracting (DAS(C)). For contract administration, the Air Force uses 
ConWrite and is currently in the process of transitioning over to the Con-IT system. For 
contract filing, the Contract (KT) File share, an electronic paperless contracting file system, 
is currently being implemented for use. For a unified acquisition policy, the contracting 
activities reference the FAR and DFARS. For service-specific policies and regulations, the 
contracting activities reference the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(AFFARS). 
e. Post-NDAA 2017 (1 October 2018-Present) 
The Army, Air Force, and Navy contracting operations and processes remained 
virtually the same. Each contracting activity continued to support to their designated MTF 
or medical clinics with very little or no interception from DHA. Specifically, the transfer 
of function (TOF) for contracting remained intact. However, DHA has issued DHAPI 
5000.01 MHS Request Submissions Portal, which “[notifies] and instruct stakeholders 
across the MHS of the newly integrated submissions and request portal and submissions 
process which went fully-operational 1 October 2018” (Defense Health Agency [DHA], 
2020). 
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(1) How is DHA gaining the desired efficiencies in acquisitions and 
procurement operations after achieving ADC? 
The section presents data that we gathered to answer the research question “Is DHA 
gaining the desired efficiencies in acquisitions in contracting operations?” The findings 
will highlight seven MTFs and identify spending trends in comparison of contract dollar 
obligated. DHA defines efficiency in contracting through the Quadruple Aim initiative, as 
described by the DHA CAE Dr. Butler. This comparative analysis aims to demonstrate if 
a reduction in costs is occurring under DHA’s Quadruple Aim initiative to lower costs. 
a. Data Collection of Total Contract Dollars Spent for WAMC 
WAMC in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is one of the seven MTFs to transition full 
ADC to DHA as of 1 October 2018. The team queried data from VCE-BI on eight Army 
MTFs; WAMC, Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC) San Antonio, General Leonard 
Wood Army Community Center (GLWACH) Fort Leonard, Carl R. Darnall Army Medical 
Center (CRDAMC), Bayne-Jones Army Community Center (BJACH) Tripler Army 
Medical Center (TAMC), and McDonald Army Health Center (MAHC). We chose WAMC 
as it was the first Army MTF to transition ADC to DHA to include budgetary functions. 
BAMC, CRDAMC, and TAMC were selected to show a comparison of MTFs that have 
not transitioned budgetary functions but are categorized to operate in a large market. 
GLWACH, BJACH, and MAHC were chosen to show a comparison of small market MTFs 
that have not yet transitioned budgetary functions either. 
As part of DHA’s financial management reform, WAMC being in the first wave of 
MTFs transitioned over to DHA is receiving funds straight from DHA with a transitional 
Intermediate Management Organization (tIMO) in place as seen in Figure 13 (Defense 
Health Agency, n.d.-a). The tIMO serves as a temporary organization to assist and oversee 
the transition of the first wave. The intent of the new funds process is to “standardized 
financial management practices” to produce information that is readily accessible and 
reliant for DHA to maintain “accountability over DHP’s extensive resources and efficiently 
and economically manage the MHS’s assets and budgets” (Wilkie, 2018).  
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Figure 13. IMO Funds Process for Phase I MTFs. Source: Wilkie (2018). 
Figure 14 depicts the total contract dollars spent from the MTFs previously 
mentioned from 1 October 2016 to 3 May 2020. As illustrated, there has been a noticeable 
increase in WAMC spending post-transition to DHA of approximately $5 million from FY 
19 to 3 May 2020 of FY 20. Concurrently the other MTFs have steadily seen a decrease in 
spending. Categorically we lack sufficient data to understand why spending has increased 
in WAMC. However, we recommend in our future study area this area is further 
investigated to find out the real reason for the spending increase at WAMC upon their 
transition to DHA.  
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*The informational data is from VCE-BI, 2020 
Figure 14. Total Contract Dollars Obligated for FY17- FY20 (1 October 2016 
to 3 May 2020) 
(1) Does the MQS strategic sourcing vehicle generate cost-savings? 
The section presents data that we gathered to answer the research question, “Does 
the MQS strategic sourcing vehicle generate cost-savings?” The findings will look at the 
latest DHA Interim Procedures Memorandum (IPM) 18–008, which instructs “MTFs and 
servicing contracting offices to use the DHA MQS contracts for the procurement of health 
care staffing requirements for market segments of a physician, nurse, dental, and ancillary 
contract services in the United States and its Territories” (DHA, 2018). 
a. MQS Mandated Usage  
The MQS vehicle is a result of section 727 of NDAA 2017 which requires “a 
common set of mandatory-use professional staffing contracts for all MTFs that provide 
direct care” (Wilkie, 2018). DHA-IPM 18–008 further highlights that utilizing the DHA 
MQS contracts to fulfill health care professional staffing requirements at MTFs is the most 







WAMC BAMC GLWACH CRDAMC BJACH TAMC MACH
FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20
37 
Notably, across-the-board utilization of the DHA MQS contracts will 
reduce duplication and fragmentation of professional staffing requirements; 
standardize administrative, management, and clinical practices across the 
MHS; and drive rate, process, and demand-based cost savings for the DOD. 
(DHA, 2018) 
Figure 15 depicts the total dollars obligated to MQS contracts across seven MTFs 
representing both large and small markets. Since the implementation of the strategic 
vehicle in April 2018, there has been a noticeable uptick in the use of the vehicle to procure 
a mixture of high- density, low-cost providers and low-density, high-cost providers. 
 
*The informational data is from VCE-BI, 2020 
Figure 15. MQS Contract for Army MTFs 
In lieu of pricing agreement DHA has established four key performance parameter 
(KPPs) to measure the effectiveness of the MQS vehicle: 1) overall fill rate; 2) on-time fill 
rate; 3) turnover rate; and 4) replenish rate (Wilkie, 2018). The goal is to fill vacancy 
positions with qualified individuals. 
38 
C. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The following section will discuss the findings and answer the research questions. 
We analyzed data gathered on medical service contracts from the FPDS-NG and VCE-BI 
from Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 through 3 May 2020 of FY 2020. We gathered the data to 
determine the number of medical service contracts that were purchased during the specified 
timeframe and total dollars obligated. To validate the reliability of the findings, we looked 
for apparent errors and missing values and determined the data was adequate for our 
analysis. Other findings that were not previously revealed earlier in the research will also 
be discussed.  
(1) How has the contracting capabilities and processes from each service 
component been affected upon inception of DHA assuming ADC of MFTs 
on 1 October 2018? 
As each service component supports their MTF upon inception of administrative 
responsibility of the MTFs, DHA established mechanisms to prevent disruption in 
contracting operations and support during the transition process. The following sections 
will identify and describe those practices in further detail.  
a. Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) 
Contracting operations is one of the critical functions that remained unaltered upon 
inception of administration and management control to DHA. This continuity was credited 
to signed MOAs between the services and DHA. These agreements provide direct 
contracting support to MTFs without mission impact. Furthermore, the MOAs establish 
roles and responsibilities between DHA and the service components with regards to 
acquisition support to the MTFs. The goal is to maintain a unified effort through the 
enterprise. 
b. Transitional Intermediate Management Organization (tIMO) 
Simultaneously, DHA established the first tIMO. The mission of the tIMO is to 
“enable an integrated system of readiness and health by supporting and holding 
accountable assigned MTFs to optimize the delivery of the Quadruple Aim” (DHA, n.d.-
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a). Soon after its inception, the tIMO assumed ADC of the first seven designated MTFS. 
One of tIMO responsibilities is to provide oversight of the MTFs ensuring a seamless 
transition into the DHA market structure (Defense Health Agency, n.d.-a). Figure 16 
illustrates this organizational structure as part of the transition for phase one.  
As previously stated, the tIMO is established to provide oversight of the initial 
transfer of the seven MTFs into the market structure. From 1 October 2018 to 1 October 
2019, the Director of DHA is also duel-hatted as the Director for the tIMO. The tIMO was 
tentatively planned to dissolve upon the activation of the market structure in October of 
2019. However, concerns were raised by the leadership about transition readiness (Gilbert, 
2019). As a result, DHA directed the continuation of tIMO operations and awarded a six-
month contract to Booz Allen in August 2019. According to the contract, a description of 
requirements included administration and planning services for logistics, information 
technology, personnel, patient safety, quality, and Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) compliance, supporting the tIMO. 
 
Figure 16. Phase I Transition. Source: Wilkie (2018). 
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c. MHS Request Submissions Portal (DHA, 2020) 
The DHAPI 5000.01, Implementation of the MHS Request Submissions Portal and 
Process, “notify and instruct stakeholders across the MHS of the newly integrated MHS 
Request Submissions Portal and submissions process” (DHA, 2020) which went active as 
of 1 October 2018. According to the MHS Request Submissions Portal: 
The Defense Health Agency (DHA) established a single, standardized 
request submission portal known as the Military Health System Request 
Submission Portal (MHSRSP), which aims to better support the overall 
requirements management process and, as a result, help enable the Military 
Health System (MHS) to achieve the Quadruple Aim. The key intended 
outcomes for the MHSRSP tool include: Standardized identification of 
capability needs/gaps and generation of cross-organizational, unified 
requirements; Improved traceability and visibility into requests and 
requirements; Cost savings and avoidance; and Improved overall 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness. (DHA, n.d.-b) 
Figure 17 provides an illustration of the request submission process flow. DHA 
established an MHS Requirements Management Knowledge Exchange website, which 
provides training on the submission process. The submission process includes “triage 
teams representatives comprised of a Request Manager, Assistant Director (AD)/Deputy 
Assistant Director (DAD) Representatives, and others who are responsible for reviewing 
initial MHS request submissions, assigning functional ownership, and facilitating the 
completion of Triage” (DHA, n.d.-d). 
 
Figure 17. MHS Requirements Management Overview. Source: DHA (n.d.-d). 
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Currently, USAHCA has utilized the portal only for the submission of MQS 
requirements. No other medical requirements from USAHCA has been routed through the 
portal as of yet. For FY 2019, USAHCA had over 4,748 contracting actions alone. These 
actions ranged from new requirements to modifications for deobligations. The NMLC had 
approximately 3,451 actions. The Air Force data was not as easily accessible as it does not 
have a designated medical contracting office. The Triage teams, per the DHA website, 
consists of 3–4 representatives for each service. The requirement submission timeline 
indicates it should take less than or equal to 90 business days, less than or equal to 45 
business days for requests to be fast-tracked and less than or equal to seven days for 
platinum requests, which consist of time-sensitive requests (DHA, n.d.-d). 
According to the timelines and the number of requirements per service for one FY, 
the DHA team’s workload will be stretched to maximum capacity. Furthermore, 
requirement end users will have to incorporate the submission timeline into their planning 
process to ensure the timely delivery of services and supplies and prevent disruption in 
services. Contracting activities will no longer receive requirements straight from the end-
user, and it will be filtered through DHA first. 
According to DHA’s 2018 Stakeholder report, since the initiation of the portal, they 
have processed an estimated 30 requests per day with an average turnaround time of 46 
business days requests stay in phase 0. Of note, the Deputy Assistant of the Army 
(Procurement) published FY19 PALT initiatives for all Army Contracting Activities 
(HCAs) and Program Executive Offices (PEOs). The goal for medical spending categories 
is 90 days. Until DHA completes a total TOF of acquisitions and contracting, each 
contracting activity will continue to follow its own published procurement lead time. As a 
result, the projected timeframe for requirements process submission may impact the 
individual services PALT to complete a requirement.  
(1) How is DHA gaining the desired efficiencies in acquisitions and 
procurement operations? 
Currently, until TOF of acquisition, each service utilizes MQS to attain services for 
their supporting MTF. Until TOF and DHA market offices are established, each service 
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will continue to carry on business as usual. As a result, this will continue to create 
competition unintentionally between the services to fill Full-Time Equivalent (FTEs), 
driving up cost. The MTFs should not hold any buying power. The MHS contracting 
requirements for personal and non-personal services should be centrally owned by each of 
DHA’s market offices to increase the market’s buying power. 
a. Spending Trends 
According to the FY 2018 DHP Agency Financial Report, the civilian health care 
market and the DHP activities correlate with one another. The increase in spending for 
WAMC demonstrates a cost-trajectory of human capital which is not aligned with the 
messaging of reducing costs and improving fiscal efficiency. To improve these trends and 
identify market patterns contracting personnel (officers) should posture next to MTF 
Commanders; to provide direct business advisement. Establishing this line of 
communication is critical; considering a majority of an MTF’s budget is comprised of 
contracted supplies and services. In a majority of facilities, more than 60% of the critical 
care service is achieved through contracting. Without contracts, the MHS will be 
inoperable. 
 
Figure 18. Military Medical Costs as a Percentage of the DOD Budget. Source: 
Defense Health Program (2017). 
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b. Enterprise-wide Contracting Capabilities 
Upon the enactment of NDAA 2017, there are no enterprise-wide contracting 
capabilities that all the service components use. As stated in the findings for research 
question one, different contracting writing systems and resource planning systems are used 
by the Air Force. Soon the Navy and Army will be deploying a new platform for contract 
writing, which will be Army Contract Writing System (ACWS) that will interface with the 
General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), an Army web-based resource 
planning system (US Army PEO, n.d.) According to the DHA Stakeholder report, “66% of 
Defense Health Program (DHP) funding now executes from a singular financial accounting 
system.” In FY21, the BUMED is expected to complete the deployment of GFEBS, 
increasing the percentage to 85% (DHA, 2018); however, as of the timeframe of this 
research, no information could be found that indicates the Air Force utilizing the same 
financial system. Without the Air Force deploying the same systems, it will be challenging 
to meet its goal to “standardize, streamline, and share critical data to improve decision-
making and audit readiness across the enterprise” (DHA, 2017) in terms of tracking DHP 
funds.  
(1) Does the MQS strategic sourcing vehicle generate cost-savings? 
a. No Established Price Agreement for MQS 
The use of the MQS vehicle may produce gains in efficiencies in the contracting 
process as a result of the direct and accessible vetted pool of contractors. However, the use 
of the contract vehicle did not generate gains in cost efficiencies through the contracting 
systems used to pull data within this research report. The market reflects current costs upon 
the time of a valid requirement. As a result of this relationship, contracting per FTE, 
especially for specialty services, can be costly. Currently, services are obtained based on 
the need of each MTF on an individual basis giving each MTF the ability to decide what 
to buy and when to buy. Based on our findings, the MHS contracting requirements for 
personal and non-personal services should be centrally-owned, consolidated, and managed 
to increase the government’s posture through improved tradecraft in the acquisition for 
services. 
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DHAs Market construct plan does demonstrate this; however, until DHA acquires 
complete ADC of the MTFs, each service will continue to carry on business as usual and 
utilize MQS to attain services for their supporting MTF only. As a result, this will 
unintentionally create competition between the services to fill FTEs, which drives up cost. 
Figures 19 and 20 depict comparisons of salaries for commercial and military contract 
medical providers in a given area. Figure 19, we compared the national average, 
Fayetteville, NC average, and contracts awarded for three medical providers general 
surgeon, nurse practitioner, and radiologist assistant. The data showed that the Army paid 
above the national and local area market value for two of the three providers. Of note, 
several factors may contribute to this cost premium. For example, the market in Fayetteville 
for a specific specialty provider may be scare compared to Raleigh, North Carolina. 
Furthermore, an MTF, such as BAMC, may have a better buying advantage to acquire a 
specialty provider given that San Antonio is figuratively considered to be a hub for medical 
specialties. These markets demonstrate that at any given time, the government may be 
susceptible to cost premiums in order to maintain medical care capabilities. 
 
*The informational data is from VCE-BI, 2020 
Figure 19. Comparison of Salaries for Commercial and Military Contracted 
Medical Providers in FT Bragg, NC 
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In Figure 20, we compared the national average, St. Louis, MO average, and 
contracts awarded for three medical providers general surgeon, nurse practitioner, and an 
ultrasound technician. The data showed that the Army was paying close to or a little above 
the national and local area market value for two of the three providers. Some of these 
differences in costs may not include the indirect costs, such as administration, security, and 
overhead. The goal of the data is to illustrate trends and identify gaps in costs and pinpoint 
high costs services for capability and planning considerations.  
 
*The informational data is from VCE-BI, 2020 
Figure 20. Comparison of Salaries for Commercial and Military Contracted 
Medical Providers in FT Leonard Wood, MO 
Figure 21 illustrates a future projection in the shortages of physicians from 2013 to 
2025. The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) revised projections saw a 
shortage between 46,100 and 90,400 physicians (Managed Care, 2016). Bottom-line, a 
multiple-award contract for medical services, will be hard to generate cost savings if the 
supply cannot keep up with the demand. The government will continue to pay the market 
value or above to attract and retain healthcare professionals. 
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Figure 21. Projected Physician Shortage. Source: AAMC (2016). 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the research findings, these recommendations focus on maximizing 
existing operational capabilities and processes and increasing contracting efficiencies. If 
any of the recommendations are implemented, they may increase efficiency, streamline 
requirements, and reduce costs while maintaining a high level of medical capability. 
1. Designate One Lead Agent for Medical Contracting 
As addressed in the findings and analysis section, each service component 
continues to operate and administer medical contracts, even while in the same geo-
graphically-aligned market. For example, the USAHCA’s Regional Health Contracting 
Office-Central located in San Antonio, Texas, continues to administer medical contracting 
for Brooke Army Medical Center (BAMC). In contrast, the 59th Medical Wing of the 
United States Airforce still administers medical contracts for Wilford Hall Ambulatory 
Surgical Center. These facilities are approximately 17 miles apart. This continued 
independence, evidenced through the existing MOU/MOAs, creates unforeseen 
competition amongst the services when soliciting for the same requirement in a given 
market. The DOD and DHA should designate a lead agent for all of the medical contracting 
to eliminate the risk of contract duplication and to take advantage of assets readily available 
to support their mission.  
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DHA should identify an organization that is the subject matter expert in medical 
contracting and can support operational and strategic requirements. Also, the designated 
organization should have the organizational structure to support DHA’s market construct 
geographically. The organization should be SCO-led to assure compliance with the 
procurement systems, provide policy, advice, guidance, resolve contracting problems, and 
monitor competition and socioeconomic programs. The lead agent should provide medical 
contracting support for medical centers, acquisition support for selected centralized 
command-wide medical personal and non-personal services contracts, and other command-
wide projects/programs. Furthermore, the organization should consist of an extensive and 
efficient acquisition approval strategy process, from simplified acquisitions to above 
Simplified Acquisitions Threshold (SAT) requirements. Also, the organization should 
possess a Government Purchase Card (GPC) Program and have the capability to host 
strategic requirement conferences and source selection acquisitions. Until a lead 
organization is designated, each of the services will continue to operate independently; 
increasing competitive costs amongst the services and reducing the ability to consolidate.  
2. One Vendor per Specialty to Service all MTFs 
Although the use of the MQS contract vehicle is mandated, its usage does not 
generate cost-savings from an award-cost perspective; evidenced through the data in the 
findings and analysis. However, from a contract administration perspective, the timeframe 
to administer awards utilizing MQS, theoretically, should take less time; vendors are 
already vetted to do business with the Government. Since the price is not set for MQS 
contracts, most proposals from contractors reflect the current market value at the time of 
government’s request. As a result the government is not advantageously postured and is 
forced to pay what the market bears at the time of the award. Consequently, the projected 
cost for a specialty provider may be one of the last factors considered when deciding to 
provide the capability or not.  
Knowing these factors, coupled with market volatility, DHA should consider the 
Dental Services Support MQS waiver that was submitted from the Army for dental 
services. The Army dental community faced fluctuations in requirements, which resulted 
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in the inability to accurately forecast the number of personnel necessary to maintain dental 
support services. Due to these fluctuations, the use of the MQS vehicle could not be utilized 
efficiently. As a result, an MQS waiver was submitted and approved. Upon approval, the 
Health Readiness Contracting Office’s (HRCO) conducted a formal source selection 
process, which resulted in an award to a single contractor to fulfill requirements in Region 
1; Central Region, Alaska, and Hawaii Dental Activities (DENTAC), and Region 2; 
Atlantic Region DENTACs. In total, 35 DENTACs with 444 Contract Services Providers 
(CSPs) are supported. This was an increase in 49 CSPs from the initial award in December 
2018. DHA may want to consider the same approach for Nurses, Physician Assistants, or 
Nurse Practitioners. This approach may save time in administering one award as opposed 
to, perhaps, 444 personal service contracts and ultimately reduce contract risk. 
3. Full-Service Line Delivery 
Another recommendation will be to change the MQS concept and to contract for 
the actual service instead of an FTE to one prime vendor. This method will set prices per 
that market and save the government money. This concept will allow for a more efficient 
option to maintain core services while sustaining readiness and critical ancillary services 
lines. One of the benefits of contracting complete product/ service lines is that the 
government and contractor can establish a resource-sharing agreement to utilize 
government-furnished space in the MTF to treat beneficiaries. This concept will ultimately 
reduce contract manpower costs and allow the DHA to focus on the Core Services that 
support readiness. Additionally, this solution enhances efficiencies in beneficiary access to 
care, improves Command and Control, strengthens the relationship between the MTF and 
installation support, facilitates readiness, and decreases travel distance between soldiers 
and family members for treatment. This acquisition strategy has Tri-Service applicability 
and can serve as a long-term solution as DHA assumes control of all MTF budgets and 
health care management from the Services. 
4. Military Medical Acquisition Support 
To assist DHA with its core capabilities for acquisitions and procurement support, 
the agency should consider military medical personnel to lead the departments below:  
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• Acquisition Process Support 
• Strategic Acquisition Program Management 
• Acquisition Policy and Control 
• Head Contracting Activity/Contracting Operations (Military 
Health System, n.d.-b) 
The military personnel should be Defense Acquisition Workforce certified in their 
requisite career fields. They should also possess on-the-job experience (i.e., U.S. Army 
Medical Materiel Agency, U.S. Army Medical Materiel Development Activity, U.S. Army 
Health Contracting Activity, and other DOD organizations). The personnel can assist in 
the overall development, implementation, and management of procurement programs 
concerning the total MHS. If warranted, military medical personnel can action contracting 
agreements with a wide variety of corporate/government entities while posturing the 
departments to support Garrison operations and deployment support during contingency 
operations effectively. 
5. Joint Medical Command 
More than 30 years ago, the 100th Congress held a hearing on the Implementation 
of a Joint Medical Command. Some of the key testimony included phrases, such as “cost-
savings, consolidation, and cross-utilization” (Implementation of Joint Military Medical 
Command, 1987). These same elements hold true today. The concept of one single 
command, Defense Health Command, to oversee DHA and the services’ surgeon generals. 
Having one command through this transition would improve synchronization between 
DHA and the services. Currently, MTF Commanders still report to a surgeon general and, 
often, are involved in the strategic decisions of the MTF, which can be both positive and 
negative. For further insight, reference COL Anthony R. Nesbitt’s 2012, the United States 
Army War College Strategic Research Project. His research concluded that “If we are 
going to see a change that is truly sustainable and is adhered to and not subjected to 
interference from parochial service structures, we must have a Joint Unified Medical 
Command” (Nesbitt, 2012). This concept should be highly considered as part of the effort 
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to consolidate requirements, reduce redundancies, and lower costs. In times of war, this 
recommendation can be optimized through the use of shared Title 10 functions, generating 
a “singular corporate process for making strategic decisions across all services” (Nesbitt, 
2012). 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the findings, analysis, and recommendations based on the 
DHA transition plan analysis. First, the research findings were presented. Next, we 
analyzed the contracting capability, contracting efficiency, and usage of the MQS contract 
vehicle. The analysis was then used to answer the research questions. Finally, based on the 
analysis of these findings, recommendations to enhance contract efficiency and improve 
the DHA transition process. The next chapter presents the conclusion of our research and 
identifies areas for further research.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSION
This research focused on three research questions. The answer to the research
questions based on the findings of the research are discussed. 
(1) How has the contracting capabilities and processes from each service
component been affected upon inception of DHA assuming administration
responsibility of MTFs on 1 October 2018?
Through gathered research, the information outlined the contracting capabilities of 
DHA and each service component. The material addressed capabilities before the release 
of the NDAA 20017 and identified any major, Tri-Service organizational changes upon 
inception of DHA assuming administrative responsibility. The goal was to highlight how 
the contracting capability will be impacted. After analyzing the information, research 
demonstrated three areas in which contracting capabilities and processes were impacted. 
First, DHA immediately established MOU/MOAs to ensure a continuous line, stable line 
of medical contracting support while focusing efforts in other areas of the transition 
process. 
Next, a tIMO was established as an intermediary to aid in a smooth transition by 
providing oversight during the initial transfer of the MTF to DHA. Last, the information 
addresses the MHS Request Submission Portal. This single access point for all 
requirements to be funneled is put in place to streamline and have transparency on all 
requests. The research highlighted the impact on contracting operations and the DHAs 
action plan to continue and enhance medical contracting support. 
(2) How is DHA gaining the desired efficiencies in acquisitions and
procurement operations after achieving ADC?
Through research assessed the efficiency through the lens of the Quadruple Aim 
initiative. Contracted data were collected from seven MTFs, one of which had fully-
transitioned to DHA, WAMC. The information identified spending patterns based on the 
total contract dollars obligated over four years. Figure 14 illustrated the total contract 
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dollars obligated for FY17- FY20 (1 October 2016 to 3 May 2020). In addition, the IMO 
funds process for Phase 1 MTFs was introduced. The information concludes that an 
increase in spending in human capital for WAMC was not in line with the Quadruple Aim 
goal of cost-savings. Additionally, the research project discovered the absence of an 
enterprise-wide contract writing system and a complemented financial system, such as 
GFEBS. Currently, efforts for collaboration between DHA, the Army, and Navy to 
standardize, streamline, and share critical data occurs. However, further synchronization 
between the services to establish enterprise-wide applications is needed to improve 
decision-making and audit readiness.  
(3) Does the MQS strategic sourcing vehicle generate cost-savings?
To answer this research question, information was gathered from VCE which 
captured the total dollars obligated from the use of the MQS contract vehicle. The 
information was used to determine the annual usage of the vehicle. Additionally, 
information compared three medical specialties with current market costs. This result was 
then compared to what the government paid for the medical specialty. The result concluded 
that the Army was paying close to or a little above the national and local area market value 
for two of the three providers. There were little savings to be identified from the use of the 
MQS contract. The government will continue to pay the market value to retain and attract 
health care providers, especially in an industry where the demand is exceeding the supply. 
However, the MQS vehicle will reduce competition amongst the services, standardize 
practices, and reduce duplication of requirements between the MTFs. 
In conclusion, the MHS is complex, but every effort should be made to ensure we 
are providing world-class care to our service members, beneficiaries, and Forever Soldiers. 
The impact of a Tri-Service medical solution has been decades in the making. The time for 
DOD to seize on this opportunity is now. The business decisions that impact medical 
readiness can pay dividends to support today’s warfighters to fight tomorrow’s battles. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The findings in this paper identified the need for further research in several areas
concerning the transformation of the MHS. Future research areas include further analysis 
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of the potential of a Joint Defense Health Command to enhance the synchronization/
collaboration between the services and DHA. Another area to focus on for further research 
would be the MQS contract vehicle. DHA may optimize the use of this strategic, 
contracting vehicle by contracting for the actual service as opposed to contracting per FTE. 
Another area for further research is reassessing each MTF and medical clinic to 
decide what capabilities are needed to support the military population. This research can 
address the demographics of the service members for a particular post or airbase and 
configure, based off of demand aggregation and trends, the medical capability that should 
be provided (long-term) to that facility. For example, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is 
mainly known for its basic training population of Military Police, Chemical, and Engineers. 
There are a small number of other units that are also stationed throughout the post. By 
studying and analyzing the demographics and medical trends, the DOD can ensure that the 
right medical capabilities are available at GLWACH. For example, does the hospital need 
a Neurosurgeon, or does the hospital need more Podiatrists? The results of the research can 
help to develop long-term solutions for medical capabilities throughout the MHS. 
Last, all the information within this research project was collected before COVID-
19. Further research on how the pandemic has impacted the DHA transition would 
undoubtedly be impactful to the entire MHS. 
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